This paper analyzes the existence of recursive equilibria in a class of convex growth models with incomplete markets. Households have identical CRRA-preferences, production displays constant returns to scale with respect to physical and human capital, and all markets are competitive. There are aggregate productivity shocks that affect the aggregate returns to physical and human capital investment (stock returns and wages), and there are idiosyncratic shocks to human capital (idiosyncratic depreciation shocks) that only affect individual human capital returns. For a given history of aggregate shocks, these idiosyncratic human capital shocks are independently distributed over time and identically distributed across agents. Finally, households have the opportunity to trade assets in zero net supply with payoffs that depend on the aggregate shock, but markets are incomplete in the sense that there are no assets with payoffs depending on idiosyncratic shocks. It is shown that there exist recursive equilibria that are simple in the sense that equilibrium prices (returns) only depend on exogenous shocks. Moreover, the allocations associated with simple recursive equilibria are identical to the equilibrium allocations of an economy in which households live in autarky and face both aggregate and idiosyncratic risk.
I. Introduction
Recent work on dynamic general equilibrium models with infinitely-lived agents and uninsurable idiosyncratic risk has provided important insights into the macroeconomic effects of market incompleteness (Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2000) . One drawback of this incompletemarkets approach to macroeconomics is that recursive equilibria are in general difficult to compute even for simple economic environments.
1 A second shortcoming is the lack of a general existence proof.
2 This paper presents a tractable macroeconomic model with incomplete markets that avoids some of the shortcomings of the previous literature. More specifically, this paper shows that for the incomplete-markets model developed here, there are always recursive equilibria that are simple in the sense that endogenous equilibrium prices (asset returns) only depend on exogenous shocks. This simplicity of equilibrium means that issues of existence and comparative dynamics can be studied at a level of generality comparable to the complete-markets literature, and that many quantitative applications are computationally straightforward.
The model is an incomplete-markets version of the class of convex growth models analyzed by, among others, Alvarez and Stokey (1998) , Caballe and Santos (1993) , Jones and Manuelli (1990) , and Rebelo (1991) . 3 More specifically, households have identical CRRA-preferences, production displays constant returns to scale with respect to reproducible input factors, and all markets are competitive. For the sake of concreteness, this paper considers the case of two input factors, namely physical and human capital. There are aggregate productivity shocks that affect aggregate returns to physical and human capital investment (stock returns and wages), and there are idiosyncratic human capital shocks (depreciations shocks) that only affect individual human capital returns. Conditional on the history of aggregate shocks, these idiosyncratic human capital shocks are independently distributed over time and identically distributed across households. Finally, the financial market structure is incomplete in the sense that there are no assets with payoffs that depend on idiosyncratic shocks. However, households have the opportunity to trade stocks (accumulate physical capital) and any asset in zero net supply with payoffs that depend on the aggregate shock variable (bonds). In particular, all households can borrow and lend at the common risk-free rate. Moreover, households' ability to trade existing assets is only limited by their ability to repay their debt in the future. In short, the only market imperfection is the lack of explicit insurance markets for idiosyncratic human capital risk.
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This paper shows that there exist simple recursive equilibria in which endogenous asset returns (prices) only depend on the exogenous aggregate state. In particular, neither the endogenous wealth distribution nor idiosyncratic shocks affect equilibrium returns. Moreover, the allocations associated with simple recursive equilibria are identical to the equilibrium allocations of an economy in which households live in autarky and face both aggregate and idiosyncratic risk. That is, the equilibrium allocations can be found by solving a one-agent decision problem. Thus, the incomplete-markets model analyzed in this paper is as tractable as its complete-markets counterpart. However, whereas idiosyncratic risk does not affect the equilibrium allocation when markets are complete, it does affect the equilibrium allocation in the incomplete-markets model. Consequently, the two models may lead to very different policy conclusions. For example, whereas social insurance of idiosyncratic risk has no effect on growth and welfare in the complete-markets economy, it has a substantial effect in the incomplete-markets economy (Krebs, 2001) . Moreover, the welfare cost of business cycles are likely to be much larger when markets for idiosyncratic risk are incomplete (Krebs, 2002a) .
Two properties of the model are essential in deriving the characterization and existence result. First, in equilibrium the ratio of physical to human capital (capital-to-labor ratio) is identical across households regardless of their current wealth or current idiosyncratic shock realization, which implies the existence of a reduced-form production function that is linear.
Second, households choose not to trade the assets in zero-net-supply. This no-trade result extends the work by Constantinides and Duffie (1996) to production economies. In accordance with Constantinides and Duffie (1996) , the current paper emphasizes the importance of permanent income shocks in the sense that income follows (approximately) a logarithmic random walk. Thus, neither borrowing and lending nor self-insurance is an optimal response to idiosyncratic income shocks. However, in contrast to Constantinides and Duffie (1996) , this paper derives the random walk property of income as an endogenous outcome.
5
In addition to the work by Constantinides and Duffie (1996) , there are further examples of tractable models with incomplete-markets and infinitely-lived agents in the literature. Magill and Quinzii (2000) consider a model with quadratic preferences (certainty-equivalence) and Angeletos and Calvet (2001) and Davis and Willen (2001) assume exponential utility and normally distributed shocks. In contrast, the current paper assumes homothetic preferences, which is the standard assumption in the growth and business cycle literature. In this sense, the model presented here seems better suited for macroeconomic analysis. Finally, there is the work by Scheinkman and Weiss (1986) and Woodford (1986) who consider models with two infinitely-lived agents that are isomorphic to two-period OLG-models because individual endowments fluctuate deterministically. In contrast to this work, the current model allows for a wide range of distributions of idiosyncratic shocks, a feature that is essential when calibrating the model based on household-level consumption and income data (Krebs 2001 (Krebs , 2002a 
Economic variables at time t are often defined by functions
There is one firm that produces an "all-purpose" good which can be used for consumption, investment in physical capital, and investment in human capital. If the firm employs K t units of physical capital and H t units of human capital in period t, then it produces Y t = A t F (K t , H t ) units of the good in period t. Here F is a standard neoclassical production function. More specifically, we assume that F displays constant-returnsto-scale, is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and sat-
Total factor productivity is a function A : S → IR ++ that assigns to each aggregate state S t a (strictly positive) productivity level 
Assumption 2. Output is produced according to
Let k it and h it stand for the stock of physical and human capital owned by household i at the beginning of period t, and denote the corresponding investment levels by x kit and x hit .
If we denote household i s consumption by c it , then the sequential budget constraint reads:
In (2) δ kt and δ ht denote the average depreciation rate of human and physical capital, respectively. These average depreciation rates are defined by functions δ k : S → IR + and
The term η it denotes a household-specific shock to the stock of human capital and is defined by a function η : s× S → IR assigning to each (s, S) s× S a realization
Notice that we allow for the possibility that η it > 0. 7 Sincer ht η it is labor income of household i, the random variable η it determines the nature of idiosyncratic labor income risk.
Assumption 3. The depreciation shocks are defined by δ kt = δ k (S t ), δ ht = δ h (S t ), and
Some remarks on the formulation of the budget constraint (2) are in order.
Remark 1. The model does not distinguish between general and specific human capital.
Similarly, the idiosyncratic shocks to human capital, η it , could be either shocks to general or shocks to specific human capital. A negative human capital shock, η it < 0, can occur when a displaced worker loses firm-or sector-specific human capital. Jovanovic (1979) and Ljungvist and Sargent (1998) analyze search models with specific human capital and idiosyncratic shocks to human capital, but they assume risk-neutral workers and do not model the accumulation of human capital. A decline in health (disability) provides a second example for a negative human capital shock. In this case, both general and specific human capital might be lost. Internal promotions and upward movement in the labor market provide two examples of positive human capital shocks (η it > 0).
Remark 2. The budget constraint (2) assumes that the wage is paid in each period. Thus, if we interpret the η−shock as the skill loss of a displaced worker, we abstract from the foregone wage during the period of unemployment and focus on the (permanent) difference between the wage before job displacement and the wage after job displacement. Empirically, the permanent component of this wage differential is quite large (Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993 , Neal 1995 , and Topel 1991 .
Remark 3. Investment in human capital is often modeled as time investment. This is equivalent to formulation (2) if we assume that
is the quantity of goods produced (consumption plus physical capital) and
is the quantity of human capital produced, where L t denotes the time spent producing the good.
Clearly, this equivalence result is driven by the joint assumption that the two production functions are identical and exhibit constant-returns-to-scale.
Remark 4. So far, there is no labor-leisure choice. This extension is briefly discussed in Section V.
Remark 5. Equation (2) does not impose a non-negativity constraint on human capital investment (x hit ≥ 0). In equilibrium, this non-negativity constraint will not be violated if positive human capital shocks are not too large. This can immediately be inferred from the Corollary.
Remark 6.
To simplify the analysis, we do not explicitly mention financial markets. However, the equilibrium allocation of the above economy in which households accumulate physical capital is also the equilibrium allocation of a stock market economy in which the firm is a stock company that makes the intertemporal investment decision. 8 If we normalize the number of outstanding shares to one, the stock price is Q t = K t+1 , household i s equity share 8 In general, this type of market arrangement might lead to conceptual problems when markets are incomplete because shareholders (households) do not agree on the optimal investment policy (Magill and Quinzii, 1996) . This, however, is not the case for the economy analyzed in this paper since here we have agreement among shareholders in the sense that the equilibrium investment policy maximizes the expected present discounted value of one-period profits using any household's intertemporal marginal rate of substitution to discount future profits.
is θ i,t+1 Q t = k i,t+1 , and the return to equity investment isr kt − δ kt . Moreover, the equilibrium allocation is unchanged if households are given the opportunity to trade j = 1, . . . , J securities in zero net supply with payoffs D jt = D j (S t ). In particular, the introduction of a risk-free asset in zero net supply (borrowing and lending at the risk-free rate) will not change the equilibrium allocation.
The budget constraint can be rewritten in a way that shows how the households's optimization problem is basically a standard intertemporal portfolio choice problem. To this end, define the following variables: 
Households have identical preferences over consumption plans {c it }. These preferences allow for a time-additive expected utility representation:
Moreover, we assume that the one-period utility function, u, is given by u(c) =
or u(c) = log c, that is, preferences exhibit constant degree of relative risk aversion γ.
Assumption 4. Preference allow for a time-additive expected utility representation (4) with one-period utility function that displays constant relative risk aversion.
II.B. Equilibrium
In general, a sequential equilibrium is a process of prices (returns) and actions defined by a sequence of functions mapping histories (date-events),(s t , S t ), into current prices and actions. In this paper, however, we are only interested in sequential equilibria with a recursive (Markov) structure. Indeed, in this paper we focus attention on recursive equilibria that are simple in a sense to be defined next.
Introduce the aggregate capital-to-labor ratioK t . = K t /H t and the production function 
Below we show that there is an equilibrium in which the capital-to-labor ratio is determined by a functionK : S → IR + assigning to each aggregate state S t−1 a capital-to-labor ratioK t = K(S t−1 ). Thus, we have r kt = r k (K(S t−1 ), S t ) and r ht = r h (K(S t−1 ), S t ), and endogenous returns (prices) in period t therefore depend on (S t−1 , S t ) only. The budget constraint (3) in conjunction with preferences (4) then imply that in this equilibrium any individually optimal plan is generated by a policy function g : 
Remark 8. In general, one would expect the portfolio choice of individual households to depend on their wealth and idiosyncratic shock realization, that is, one would expect
In this case, inspection of the market clearing condition immediately shows that no simple recursive equilibrium exists. However, if it happens to be the case thatk it =k(S t−1 ), then the market clearing condition is satisfied ifK(S t−1 ) =k(S t−1 ).
III. Existence and Characterization of Equilibrium
Consider an economy in which households live in autarky. That is, consider the decision problem of a household i who has direct access to the production technology F , but no access to financial markets. In this case, household i chooses a plan
The stochastic productivity and depreciation parameters in (6) are again defined by functions , S t+1 |S t ). Because of our previous assumption that the transition probabilities are symmetric with respect to households, these marginal transition probabilities are the same for all households.
Let w it andk it be defined as before. Because of the constant-returns-to-scale assumption, the maximization problem (6) can be rewritten as
s.t. :
where we introduced the total return on investment (in physical and human capital)
In (8) the investment return functions r k and r h are defined as in (5).
It follows from the structure of the decision problem (7) that any plan solving (7) 
, then this allocation remains an equilibrium allocation and no trading of the
j = 1, .
. . , J short-lived assets is an equilibrium outcome.
Proof: See appendix.
Remark 9. The property that the ratiok is independent of s it and w it , and therefore the same for all households, is essential for the result that joint production (market economy of previous section) and autarky production (economy of current section) lead to the same allocation: if all households in the market economy choose the samek, then the production function is basically linear, and the scale of production is irrelevant.
Remark 10. There is a simple intuition for the result that households choose the same ratiok in the equilibrium of the market economy. Because of the joint assumption of homothetic preferences and no exogenous source of income (labor income is generated through human capital accumulation), the relative share of wealth invested in any asset (physical and human capital) is independent of the wealth level. Further, these portfolio shares do not depend on s t because idiosyncratic shocks have no predictive power. In short, portfolio shares, and therefore the ratiok, are the same for all households. A similar intuition shows that the (relative) excess demand for any security j whose payoffs do not depend on s t+1 is the same for all households (independent of w it and s it ), and the only way to clear markets is to have zero excess demand for each household. An alternative intuition for the no-trade result is provided by (12), which shows that idiosyncratic income shocks are permanent in the sense that individual income (approximately)follows a logarithmic random walk.
Remark 11. Any recursive equilibrium defines a joint Markov process over endogenous and exogenous variables with stationary transition function. Given that individual equilibrium consumption and income follow a logarithmic random walk with state-dependent drift (see equation 11), there is no stationary distribution of equilibrium consumption and income.
Thus, there is no stationary Markov equilibrium in the sense of Duffie et al. (1994) . However, the ratio variablesk (ratio of physical to human capital) andc (ratio of consumption to wealth) follow a stationary Markov process if the exogenous shock process {S t } is stationary.
This follows immediately from the fact that the equilibrium values of the ratio variables are functions of S only.
Proposition 1 assumes that a solution to the one-agent decision problem (7) exists. If γ < 1 and capital returns are too high or if γ > 1 and capital returns are too low (too negative), then a solution to (7) will not exist. However, if the condition
is satisfied, then a solution exists (proposition 2 below). Notice that for γ = 1 (log-utility), (9) reduces to β < 1. Condition (9) extends the condition appearing in Jones and Manuelli (1990) to the case of uncertainty. Jones, Manuelli, and Stacchetti (1999) consider an economy with uncertainty similar to the one analyzed here. They, however, confine attention to the linear Markov case with Cobb-Douglas production function and no depreciation shocks, but allow for random variables with uncountable support. For linear Markov processes with
Cobb-Douglas production function and no depreciation shocks, condition (9) is the finitestate-space analog of the existence condition in Jones, Manuelli, and Stacchetti (1999) . (9) 
Proposition 2. Suppose condition
In particular, if γ = 1 (log-utility), we havec = 1 − β.
Proof : See appendix. Combining proposition 1 and 2, we have:
Corollary Suppose condition (9) is satisfied. Then there exists a simple recursive equi-librium with equilibrium allocatioñ
and aggregate asset returns 
where the pricing kernel, M , is given by
Remark 12. Although the ratio variablesk t andc t are the same for all households, the variables k it , h it , and c it of course differ across households. That is, idiosyncratic risk matters.
Note also that the equilibrium values of the ratiosk t andc t are in general different from the values that obtain when markets are complete.
We can gain additional insight into the structure of equilibrium by considering the implications for individual income and consumption. The corollary implies that
where y hit =r ht h it is labor income of household i in period t. Thus, conditional on the history of aggregate shocks, the growth rates of labor income and consumption are unpredictable (recall that s i,t+1 is unpredictable). Taking logs and using the approximation log(1 + r) ≈ r, we find
. In other words, conditional on the history of aggregate shocks, individual labor income therefore follows approximately a logarithmic random walk. In this sense, income shocks are permanent, which provides yet another intuition for the no-trade result and relates the current production economy to the exchange economy studied by Constantinides and Duffie (1996) .
The model has interesting implications for aggregate consumption if aggregate shocks are unpredictable: π(S |S) = π(S). In this case, per capita consumption growth is
Thus, per capita consumption growth rates are i.i.d., that is, it follows (approximately) a logarithmic random walk and the risk-free rate is constant. Annual data on real shortterm interest rates and consumption show only small deviations from these two properties (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999) .
IV. Extension: Labor-Leisure Choice
Suppose now that output is produced according to
, where A t and F have the same properties as before and L t is total number of hours households spent working. 9 Preferences are no given by
where u is again a CRRA-utility function and v is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave function satisfying the appropriate boundary conditions to ensure the interiority of the optimal labor choice. Mutatis Mutandis, the a simple recursive equilibrium is defined as in section II.
Define again total welath as w it = k it + h it and the ratio variablesk it = k it /h it and
A straightforward extension of the arguments made in the proof of propositions 1 and 2 shows that there is a simple recursive equilibrium in which households choosek it =K(S t−1 ),c it =c(S t ), and l it = l(S t−1 , S t ) if the following equation system has a solution:
∀S :c(S) = 1
where r k and r h are the modified return functions (5).
V. Conclusion
This paper developed a tractable macroeconomic model with incomplete markets and showed that there are simple recursive equilibria. Because of space limitations, this paper did 9 A more realistic assumption might be that i h it l it enters as an argument into the production function. However, since in equilibrium l it = l t (see below), this assumption leads to the same result.
not discuss any applications of the framework to macroeconomic policy analysis. However, the model has already been used to study the growth and welfare effects of social insurance (Krebs 2001 ) and the welfare cost of business cycles (Krebs, 2002a) .
The current paper does not address the question why certain insurance markets for idiosyncratic human capital risk are missing. One possible explanation for this lack of insurance might be the asymmetry of information with respect to idiosyncratic human capital shocks.
An interesting question for future research is to investigate under what conditions the equilibrium allocation of the incomplete-markets economy is also the constrained efficient allocation of an economy with asymmetric/private information. The work by Atkeson and Lucas (1992) suggest that this equivalence does not necessarily hold. However, Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) have shown that the incomplete-market equilibria lead to constrained efficient allocations if information about both individual income and wealth are private. Extending the analysis of Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) to the current model is an interesting topic for future research.
other words,
Using w it = c it (1+r it )c it and ≤c it ≤ 1− and r min ≤ r it ≤ r max for some > 0, r min > −1, and r max < ∞, we find that the transversality condition (A2) holds iff (A3) holds. The existence of r min and r max follows from the maintained assumptions on the production process. For γ = 1 (log-utility), an analogous argument shows that (A2) holds.
We can think of {w it ,k it , c it } as the solution to a social planner problem in a one-agent economy. There is a market problem corresponding to this social planner problem, which is to maximize (4) subject to the budget constraint (3) with (given) market returns r kt = r k (k it , S t ) and r ht = r h (k it , S t ). Equations (A1) and (A2) are also the Euler equations and transversality condition associated with this market problem (straightforward calculation).
Since Euler equations and transversality condition together are sufficient conditions for utility maximization 11 and because {w it ,k it , c it } is budget-feasible, this plan is also the solution to the market problem. Thus, we have shown that if the one-agent decision problem has a solution, then this solution is also the competitive equilibrium of the one-agent market economy.
Consider now the I-agent market economy. From the above argument we conclude that the policy {w it ,k it , c it } is also individually optimal in the I-agent market economy when returns are given by r kt = r k (k it , S t ) and r ht = r h (k it , S t ) . Thus, it suffices to show that market clearing holds. But with a common capital-to-labor ratio,k it =k(S t−1 ), market clearing automatically holds (for any possible wealth distribution). ,k it , w i,t+1 ) and has the additional propertyk it =k(S t−1 ). Then the corresponding market equilibrium is clearly a simple recursive equilibrium.
Finally, suppose that households have the opportunity to trade j = 1, . . . , J securities in zero net supply with payoffs D jt = D j (S t ). The new budget constraint becomes:
given , 
The pricing kernel M is simply the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution,
Clearly, the assumption thatk i,t+1 =k(S t ) andc it =c(S t ) is essential for ensuring that the 
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 2
The proof runs as follows. First, we show that there is a solution to the Euler equations which has the stated properties. Second, we show that any solution to the Euler equations also satisfies a transversality condition. Since in our case Euler equations and transversality condition are sufficient conditions for an optimum, we have proved that a solution to the maximization problem (7) with the stated properties exists. Uniqueness of the solution immediately follows from the strict concavity of the objective function in conjunction with the convexity of the choice set.
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We will prove the proposition for γ = 1. For γ = 1 (log-utility) the proof follows similar lines. Using c it =c it (1+r it )w it and w i,t+1 = (1+r it )w it −c it , we find that the Euler equations (A1) are satisfied if the equation system (10) in proposition 2 has a solution 0 <c(S) ≤ 1 andk(S) ≥ 0. Denote the number of elements of S by |S|. Since the state space, S, is finite, the functionsc andk can be identified with finite-dimensional vectorsc ∈ IR |S| + and 13 There is an alternative way of proving proposition 2. First, extend the argument in Becker and Boyd (1997) and Jones and Manuelli (1990) to show that a solution to (7) exists, that is, show that the objective function is semi-continuous and the choice set is compact in the product topology. Since the solution to (7) is unique (strict concavity of the utility function in conjunction with convexity of the choice set) and Euler equations are necessary, it then suffices to show that a unique solution to the Euler equations exists (contraction mapping theorem). Jones, Manuelli, and Staccetti (1999) provide a proof along those lines for economies with Cobb-Douglas production function, linear Markov shocks, and no depreciation shocks. Notice that for anyc >> 0, the solution,k , to the second set of Euler equations exists and is unique. This immediately follows from the properties of r h , r k , r that are an implication of the assumption of a standard neoclasscial production function. To prove the existence of a solution to (10), we apply Brower's fixed point theorem. Thus, we need to show the existence of a non-empty, convex, and compact set X for which T is continuous.
We choose X ≡ ([ , 1])
|S| × ([0, B]) |S| for some 0 < < 1 and B < ∞ (below we show that we can boundc away from one). Clearly, this set is non-empty, convex, and compact.
Moreover, it is straightforward to show the continuity of T on X. Thus, it is left to show that the two numbers B and exist. Notice the importance of boundingc away from zero, since T is not even defined ifc(S) = 0 for some S ∈ S.
We begin with the existence of a strictly positive number . We want to show that if 
Condition (9) ensures that the term in the brackets is strictly less than one, which implies that for each S we can find a small enough (S) > 0 so that (A6) holds. Since there are only finitely many states S, we can choose . = min S (S). Notice that in general B = B( ), but that the number can be found independently ofk and therefore B.
Finally, we show that the transversality condition (A2) holds. Using c iT =c iT (1 + r iT )w iT and the fact that ≤c iT ≤ 1 − and r min ≤ r iT ≤ r max for some > 0, r min > −1, and r max < ∞, we find that (A2) holds iff the following holds
Repeated substitution of w i,t+1 = (1 −c it )(1 + r it )w it , t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1, shows that (A7)
holds if
In ( 
Inequality (A9) establishes an upper bound onc that is strictly smaller than one. Using this inequality, condition (9) in the main text, and γ > 1, we find
This completes the proof of proposition 2.
